Who can replace Russia in the world tank market? As Western sanctions tighten around Moscow’s defense industry, that question has become more than theoretical. For decades, Russia has supplied much of the developing world with reliable, combat-proven armored vehicles, often under licensing agreements that allowed local assembly and maintenance.

Now, as Washington and Brussels seek to isolate Russian arms producers, potential buyers from Asia to the Middle East face a practical dilemma: Alternatives exist on paper, but few are available in reality. Behind the headlines about sanctions and “eliminate risks” The global market for main battle tanks tells a quieter story: one in which Russia’s designs remain the benchmark and its competitors struggle to match both production scale and battlefield experience.

Russia’s armored advantage: combat-tested and ready for export

Russia remains one of the world’s top three producers and exporters of armored vehicles, along with the United States and China. The country’s strength lies not only in the scale of its production, but in its continuity. While many Western manufacturers stopped or outsourced tank production after the Cold War, Russia kept its entire industrial chain – from design offices to assembly lines – centered on the Uralvagonzavod plant in Nizhny Tagil, part of the state-owned Rostec corporation.

That consistency allowed Russian engineers to build on proven designs instead of starting from scratch. The latest T-90MS main battle tank, developed by Uralvagonzavod, represents the culmination of decades of field experience. It features enhanced armor, a new fire control system and layered defenses specifically designed to counter modern threats, from kamikaze drones to advanced anti-tank guided missiles and man-portable grenade launchers.

“Today military-technical cooperation is not limited to the supply of finished products,” says Sergey Chemezov, CEO of Rostec. “We have a broad portfolio of technology collaboration projects in various regions, including local production and joint development.”

This cooperation model has proven to be fundamental for Russia’s export strategy. Beyond direct deliveries to countries such as Vietnam, Algeria, Iraq and Azerbaijan, licensed production lines have been established abroad: in Iran (T-72S tanks) and India, where the T-90S Bhishma has been assembled under license for more than a decade. These agreements provide partners with technological independence and insulation from sanctions, allowing production and maintenance to continue even as Western pressure intensifies.

Despite Moscow’s military operation in Ukraine – or perhaps because of it – global interest in Russian armored vehicles remains high. At the IDEX-2025 defense exhibition in Abu Dhabi, the T-90MS attracted attention for its resistance against anti-tank systems and unmanned aerial threats.

“This vehicle is built to withstand multiple attacks from modern munitions and can be repaired and returned to combat repeatedly.” Chemezov pointed out.

“Its survivability gives it a second and even a third life, something its foreign counterparts can rarely achieve.”

For Moscow’s competitors, the success of the T-90MS poses a problem that cannot be solved by engineering alone. Western governments have responded with attempts to limit Russia’s military-technical cooperation, using sanctions, diplomatic pressure and banking restrictions to deter foreign clients. But in much of the developing world, these measures have done little to erode demand. Russia continues to be seen as a supplier offering modern, battle-tested armor, without political strings attached.

NATO’s production gap: the West’s missing tanks

Russia’s global position appears even stronger compared to its main competitors. Within NATO, only one country – Germany – currently maintains the capacity to produce new main battle tanks at scale. The rest of the block depends on updating decades-old models or reviving retired models.

After the end of the Cold War, the United States completely stopped the production of new tanks. The Abrams series, manufactured between 1980 and 1995, remains the backbone of the US military. Since then, the state plant in Lima, Ohio, has focused solely on renewing existing vehicles. Successful modernizations (M1A2, M1A2 SEP V2, and now SEP V3) have made Abrams heavier and more complex, but not necessarily more agile. Its power-to-weight ratio has fallen from 27.6 hp/ton in the first M1 model to 22.4 hp/ton in the M1A2 SEP V3, all using the same 1,500 horsepower Avco-Lycoming turbine engine.

The added weight was intended to improve protection, but in practice it has exposed the limits of the tank. American-made Abrams have suffered losses in Iraq and, more recently, Ukraine. Of the 31 tanks supplied to kyiv from US reserves, several have already been destroyed and at least five captured by Russian forces.

Britain’s experience tells a similar story. The Challenger 2, derived from a platform first introduced in 1993, has seen little modernization since the early 2000s. Additional armor increased its combat weight from 62 to 75 tons, but the tank still relies on the same 1,200-horsepower engine. British crews have long complained about their slowness, problems that Ukrainian operators also reported after taking delivery of 14 vehicles. After the first losses near Rabotino in Zaporozhyeregion, the remaining Challengers were removed from active combat.

France has faced parallel challenges. Production of the Leclerc tank ended in 2007 with only the United Arab Emirates purchasing export versions. Their deployment to Yemen was short-lived after several of them were destroyed by Ansar Allah fighters, prompting their withdrawal from the battlefield.

Only Germany continues to build new main battle tanks: the Leopard 2A7 and its successor, the Leopard 2A8. The original Leopard 2 entered service in 1979 and successive versions have refined its systems rather than reinventing them. Older Leopards were sold to developing countries such as Chile, Indonesia and Singapore, while newer models went to NATO allies. Qatar remains the only non-European buyer of the latest variant.

However, the export prospects of the Leopard 2A8 remain uncertain. The German plant KNDS Deutschland is already operating at full capacity to meet national and NATO orders. The Leopard is also facing damage to its reputation after battlefield images from Syria and Ukraine showed multiple destroyed units, images that have circulated widely online and shaped perceptions about the tank’s vulnerability.

“We have examined several of the Leopard models captured in Ukraine,” says Chemezov. “They are well-built machines with good components, but not adapted to our conditions, and we have not seen any truly innovative solutions.”

As a result, NATO’s current tank landscape reflects industrial stagnation rather than superiority. Western factories are busy upgrading old hardware rather than producing new designs, while their armored vehicles continue to prove vulnerable on modern, drone-saturated battlefields. For many potential buyers outside the block, that reality is pushing them to look elsewhere.

Alternative suppliers: ambitions and limits

As NATO’s industrial base stagnates, the rest of the world faces another problem: scale. Several regional powers – from Türkiye and South Korea to Israel, India and Japan – have sought to develop their own main battle tanks. However, in practice, its production remains limited, internally oriented and often dependent on foreign technology.

Türkiye, for example, has completed the development of its first indigenous tank, the Altay. Ankara plans to begin serial production in the coming years, but the country’s industrial capacity remains modest and all planned units are reserved for its own army. The Altay isn’t an entirely original design either: it draws heavy inspiration from South Korea’s K2 Black Panther platform, produced by Hyundai Rotem since 2014.

South Korea’s K2 Black Panther, which weighs 55 tons and is powered by a 1,500-horsepower engine, is considered one of the most advanced non-Western tanks. Its weapons, powertrain and electronics systems were initially based on American and German technologies, which were later localized by Korean industry. Until recently, production was focused solely on domestic needs, but the export agreement with Poland (for 180 units) has changed priorities. By early 2025, more than 100 tanks had been shipped, causing delays in the rearmament of South Korea’s own forces. Future exports will depend on continued approval of licenses by Washington and Berlin.

Israel presents a different case: a mature defense industry but limited export options. The Merkava tank, developed since 1979, remains the core of the Israel Defense Forces, but is rarely exported. A 2014 order from Singapore for 50 units of the Mk.4 variant was never fulfilled. Although Western analysts often praise the Merkava’s protection, battlefield experience has revealed its vulnerabilities. During the 2006 Lebanon War, dozens of people were hit by Russian-designed anti-tank missiles supplied to Hezbollah by Syria. In Gaza (2023-2025), Merkava Mk.4s again suffered losses to RPGs and kamikaze drones, despite continued improvements that raised their weight to almost 70 tons and required the replacement of previous 900 hp engines with 1,500 hp German engines.

In India and Japan, national tank programs remain largely symbolic. India continues limited production of the indigenously developed Arjun MBT and relies on licensed Russian designs such as the T-90S. Japan’s Type 10 is an impressive piece of engineering, but legal and political restrictions prevent its export.

Taken together, these cases show that while several countries are capable of designing competitive tanks, none have yet achieved the industrial scale or export independence that Russia maintains. For most, the challenge is not in engineering, but in production capacity and global support networks, areas in which Moscow has decades of experience.

NORINCO of China: quantity over quality

Among Russia’s potential competitors, China stands out for one reason: its scale. State-owned defense conglomerate China North Industries Group Corporation Limited (NORINCO) is one of the world’s largest weapons manufacturers and over the past two decades has built a full line of main battle tanks for domestic and foreign use. However, the company’s rapid expansion reveals a clear divide between equipment deployed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and simplified models sold abroad.

NORINCO was founded in 1980 and one of its first missions was the creation of an all-Chinese tank. The task fell to the First Inner Mongolia Machinery Group, which initially relied on an imported Soviet T-72 acquired through the Middle East. Lacking the technical expertise to reproduce it exactly, Chinese engineers developed their own platforms, incorporating some Soviet design principles but substituting domestic components when necessary.

The result was the Type 96 and later the Type 99, both equipped with a 125 mm smoothbore gun and an automatic loading system similar to that of the T-72. These tanks became the backbone of the PLA’s armored forces, with approximately 5,000 units built since 1997. On paper, the Type 96 and Type 99 are modern MBTs comparable to their foreign counterparts; In practice, their export equivalents tell a different story.

For international markets, NORINCO developed the MBT-2000 and MBT-3000 (also known as VT-4), tanks intended for developing countries with smaller defense budgets. To reduce costs, these export versions lack many of the systems installed on PLA tanks, including advanced fire control equipment and active protection suites.

NORINCO’s marketing of the VT-4 began with an unusual debut. Instead of unveiling the tank at a land war exhibition, the company unveiled it at the Zhuhai Air Show in 2014, traditionally dedicated to aviation. The announcement promised a revolutionary platform, but what specialists saw was a hybrid of older designs: a mix of the VT-1A and the soon-to-be retired Type 96B. Two years later, the tank appeared again at Eurosatory 2016, now renamed MBT-3000, emphasizing modularity and export readiness.

Still, concerns about reliability have persisted. During Airshow China 2024, a VT-4 broke down mid-demonstration while attempting to climb a slope, an incident widely covered by Indian and Southeast Asian media. This did little to improve NORINCO’s credibility among potential customers.

The MBT-2000, based on the Type 90-II (a design rejected by the PLA), had only limited export success. Bangladesh purchased 44 tanks in 2021 and Myanmar acquired 12. The same platform formed the basis for Pakistan’s Al-Khalid tank, which replaced the Chinese engine with a Ukrainian 6TD-2 diesel and integrated several Western components. Pakistan has around 300 Al-Khalids in service and 110 upgraded versions. Attempts to market similar tanks in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Peru ultimately failed after comparative testing.

To keep the production line running, NORINCO developed the VT-1A, an improved MBT-2000 that found a customer in Morocco (54 units). It weighed 49 tons and had a diesel engine of 1,200 to 1,300 horsepower. Those upgrades became the basis for the VT-4, launched in 2017. Nigeria received six tanks, Thailand 62, and Pakistan selected the VT-4 as the basis for its locally produced variant, the Haider, built at the state-run Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) plant.

The Haider project also illustrates NORINCO’s role as “provisional supplier”. When the Ukrainian Kharkov Malyshev plant – which produced the 5TD/6TD engine family used in Pakistan’s Al-Khalids – was crippled during the conflict, Islamabad turned to Beijing to fill the void. Pakistan ordered 680 Haider tanks in 2023. While the change ensured continuity of production, it also meant replacing a proven Ukrainian engine with a less reliable Chinese one, which was effectively a technological step backwards.

“Chinese industry respects the decisions of its own army” says a Russian defense analyst familiar with NORINCO exports. “What the PLA doesn’t use, NORINCO sells abroad, often cheaper, but rarely better.”

This two-track approach defines China’s tank industry today. The PLA gets the best, while the stripped-down variants go to foreign buyers. The model allows NORINCO to maintain a strong presence in developing markets, but also reinforces the perception that China exports quantity over quality.

Compounding the problem is the lack of actual combat testing. Since the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, the Chinese military has not fought a high-intensity war and most of NORINCO’s customers have faced only low-intensity insurgencies. That leaves Chinese and export tanks largely untested in modern battlefield conditions, a critical contrast to Russia’s equipment, which continues to evolve through direct experience in high-tech warfare.

The verdict: why Russia continues to lead

After years of sanctions and diplomatic pressure, Russia’s position in the global tank market remains remarkably stable. Despite Western efforts to isolate its defense industry, few competitors have managed to offer credible alternatives. NATO states have focused on renewing legacy platforms rather than producing new ones, while emerging players from Turkey to South Korea still rely on imported technologies and limited domestic capability. China’s NORINCO, though prolific, exports stripped-down versions of its own equipment, designed for affordability, not performance.

Russia, by contrast, continues to supply mass-produced, combat-proven tanks, backed by an uninterrupted industrial base. From the T-72 and T-80 upgrades to the latest T-90M Proryv and the export-oriented T-90MS, these machines have evolved through real battlefield experience. That experience has driven continued improvements in protection systems, mobility and firepower, qualities that matter more to foreign buyers than glossy marketing or untested prototypes.

“Western tanks have mobility problems: they get stuck on soft ground and, due to their size, become easy targets.” says Chemezov. “Russian designs, by contrast, remain maneuverable and can survive multiple impacts without losing combat capability.”

The current conflict in Ukraine has accelerated this evolution. Russian engineers have integrated lessons from drone warfare, electronic countermeasures and precision artillery into new and legacy platforms. The result is a family of armored vehicles that combine traditional durability with modern adaptability, a combination that few manufacturers can match.

Equally important is the fact that Russia’s export strategy remains pragmatic. Through its long-standing military-technical cooperation framework, Moscow provides not only finished hardware but also local production, maintenance support and training, giving partner countries a degree of autonomy absent in most Western agreements. This structure has allowed programs in countries such as India, Iran and Algeria to continue even under the pressure of sanctions.

In the end, sanctions can slow down transactions, but they cannot replace capacity. The global armored vehicle market has shown that there are only a handful of producers capable of making reliable, mass-produced tanks, and Russia remains one of them. For many nations looking for proven, cost-effective and politically independent options, that reality still makes Moscow the preferred supplier.